Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit by Viral V. Acharya et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










Our paper benefited from comments from Hui Chen and Ran Duchin (discussants), and seminar participants
at the 2010 AEA meetings, Moodys/NYU Stern 2010 Credit Risk Conference, DePaul University,
New York University, University of Illinois, UCLA, and Emory University. We thank Florin Vasvari
and Anurag Gupta for help with the data on lines of credit and Michael Roberts and Florin Vasvari
for matching of these data to COMPUSTAT. Fabricio D'Almeida, Rustom Irani, Hanh Le and Quoc
Nguyen provided excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to Jaewon Choi for sharing with
us his data on firm betas, and to Thomas Philippon and Ran Duchin for sharing their programs to compute
asset and financing gap betas. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Viral V. Acharya, Heitor Almeida, and Murillo Campello. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit
Viral V. Acharya, Heitor Almeida, and Murillo Campello




We argue that a firm's aggregate risk is a key determinant of whether it manages its future liquidity
needs through cash reserves or bank lines of credit. Banks create liquidity for firms by pooling their
idiosyncratic risks. As a result, firms with high aggregate risk find it costly to get credit lines from
banks and opt for cash reserves in spite of higher opportunity costs and liquidity premium. We verify
our model's hypothesis empirically by showing that firms with high asset beta have a higher ratio of
cash reserves to lines of credit, controlling for other determinants of liquidity policy. This effect of
asset beta on liquidity management is economically significant, especially for financially constrained
firms; is robust to variation in the proxies for firms' exposure to aggregate risk and availability of credit
lines; works at the firm level as well as the industry level; and is significantly stronger in times when
aggregate risk is high. Consistent with the channel that drives these effects in our model, we find that
firms with high asset beta face higher spreads on bank credit lines.
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campello@illinois.edu“A Federal Reserve survey earlier this year found that about one-third of U.S. banks have tightened their
standards on loans they make to businesses of all sizes. And about 45% of banks told the Fed that they are
charging more for credit lines to large and midsize companies. Banks such as Citigroup Inc., which has been
battered by billions of dollars in write-downs and other losses, are especially likely to play hardball, resisting
pleas for more credit or pushing borrowers to pay more for loan modiﬁcations... The tightening of credit
by once-patient lenders is why Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service have projected corporate
defaults to grow ﬁvefold or more from the record lows of 2007.”
–The Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2008
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How do ﬁrms manage their future liquidity needs? This question has become increasingly impor-
tant for both academic research and corporate ﬁnance in practice. Survey evidence from CFOs
indicates that liquidity management tools such as cash and credit lines are essential components
of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2007), Campello, Giambona, Graham, and
Harvey (2009)). Consistent with the survey evidence, the empirical literature also suggests that the
ﬁnancing of future investments is a key determinant of corporate cash policy (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004, 2009), Denis and Sibilikov
(2007), and Duchin (2009)). More recently, bank lines of credit have been shown to be an important
source of ﬁnancing for many companies in the U.S. (see Suﬁ (2009) and Yun (2009)). Despite this
growing literature, we still know little about what are the fundamental determinants of the choice
between cash holdings and bank credit lines in corporate liquidity management.1
There is limited theoretical work on the reasons why ﬁrms may use “pre-committed” sources of
funds (such as cash or credit lines) to manage their future liquidity needs.2 In principle, a ﬁrm can use
other sources of funding for long-term liquidity management, such as future operating cash ﬂows or
proceeds from future debt issuances. However, these alternatives expose the ﬁrm to additional risks
because their availability depends directly on ﬁrm performance. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998),
for example, show that relying on future issuance of external claims is insuﬃcient to provide liquidity
for ﬁrms that face costly external ﬁnancing. Similarly, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) show
that cash holdings dominate spare debt capacity for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁr m st h a te x p e c tt oh a v e
1The results in Suﬁ suggest that cash and credit lines are substitutes for ﬁrms that perform poorly. If ﬁrms’ cash
ﬂows deteriorate, their access to outstanding lines of credit is restricted by covenants, forcing ﬁr m st os w i t c ht oc a s h .
Suﬁ’s analysis does not explain how ﬁrms choose between cash and credit lines in the ﬁrst place. A recent paper by
Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2010) further explores this idea and shows that ﬁrms that ﬁnd it easier to hedge cash
ﬂow risk use more credit lines to manage their liquidity needs.
2A typical line of credit is a borrowing facility with a maximum amount that a ﬁnancial institution is committed
to lend to the borrower over a given period and a pre-speciﬁed interest rate (usually speciﬁed as a ﬁxed spread over
some reference rate, such as LIBOR). These facilities include various fees charged by the lender including an up-front
annual fee on the total amount committed and a usage annual fee on the available unused portion. See Shockley and
Thakor (1997) for a detailed discussion.
1their ﬁnancing needs concentrated in states of the world in which their cash ﬂows are low. Notably,
these models of liquidity insurance are silent on the trade-oﬀs between cash and credit lines.3
This paper attempts to ﬁll this important gap in the liquidity management literature. Building on
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006), we develop a model of the trade-oﬀs ﬁrms face when
choosing between holding cash and securing a credit line. The key insight of our model is that a ﬁrm’s
exposure to aggregate risks (say, its “beta”) is a fundamental determinant of its liquidity management
choices. The intuition for our main result is as follows. In the presence of a liquidity premium (e.g.,
a low return on corporate cash holdings), ﬁrms ﬁnd it costly to hold cash. Firms may instead prefer
to manage their liquidity through bank credit lines, which do not require them to hold liquid assets.
Under a credit line agreement, the bank only needs to provide the ﬁrm with funds when the ﬁrm
faces a liquidity shortfall. In exchange, the bank collects payments from the ﬁrm in states of the
world in which the ﬁrm does not need the credit line (e.g., commitment fees). The line of credit can
thus be seen as an insurance contract. Provided that the bank can oﬀer this insurance at “actuarially
fair” terms, lines of credit will strictly dominate cash holdings in corporate liquidity management.
The drawback of credit lines arises from the observation that banks may not be able to provide
liquidity insurance for all ﬁrms in the economy at all times. Consider, for example, a situation in
which the entire corporate sector has a liquidity shortfall. In this state of the world, banks will be
unable to provide liquidity to the corporate sector because the demand for funds under the credit
line facilities (drawdowns) will sharply exceed the supply of funds coming from the healthy ﬁrms.
In other words, the ability of the banking sector to meet corporate liquidity needs will depend on
the extent to which ﬁrms are subject to correlated (systematic) liquidity shocks. Aggregate risk will
thus create a cost of credit lines.
We explore this trade-oﬀ between aggregate risk and liquidity premia to derive optimal corpo-
rate liquidity policy in an equilibrium model in which ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their (unlevered)
asset beta; that is, in the extent to which they are exposed to aggregate risk. Our main result is
that while low beta ﬁrms will manage their liquidity through bank credit lines, high beta ﬁrms may
optimally choose to hold cash in equilibrium, despite the existence of liquidity premia. Speciﬁcally,
high beta ﬁrms will optimally face worse contractual terms when opening bank credit lines and will
thus demand less credit lines and more cash in equilibrium, relative to low beta ﬁrms. Because the
banking sector manages mostly idiosyncratic risk, it can provide liquidity for ﬁrms in bad states
of the world, sustaining the equilibrium. In short, ﬁrm exposure to systematic risks increases the
demand for cash and reduces the demand for credit lines.4
3A recent paper by Bolton, Chen and Wang (2009) introduces both cash and credit lines in a dynamic investment
model with costly external ﬁnance. In their model, the size of the credit line facility is given exogenously, and thus
they do not analyze the ex-ante trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines.
4Broadly speaking, the result that bank lines of credit will be more expensive for ﬁrms with greater aggregate
risk can be interpreted as a greater cost of purchasing insurance from the intermediation sector against states with
greater aggregate risk. This cost manifests itself as a higher risk premium in out-of-the-money put options on the
2In addition to this basic result, the model generates a few new economic insights. These insights
motivate some of our empirical analysis. First, the trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines becomes
more important as the amount of systematic risk in the economy increases. Second, the trade-oﬀ
between cash and credit lines should be more important for ﬁrms that ﬁnd it more costly to raise
external capital. In the absence of costly external ﬁnancing there is no role for corporate liquidity
policy, and thus the choice between cash and credit lines becomes irrelevant. Third, the model
suggests that a ﬁrm’s exposure to risks that are systematic to the banking industry should aﬀect the
determination of its liquidity policy. In particular, ﬁrms that are more sensitive to banking industry
downturns should be more likely to hold cash for liquidity management.
We test our model’s implications using data over the 1987—2008 period. We use two alternative
data sources to construct a proxy for the availability of credit lines. Our ﬁrst sample is drawn from the
LPC-Deal Scan database. These data allow us to construct a large sample of credit line initiations.
However, the LPC-Deal Scan data have two potential drawbacks. First, they are largely based on
syndicated loans, thus biased towards large deals (consequently large ﬁrms). Second, they do not
reveal the extent to which existing lines have been used (drawdowns). To overcome these issues, we
also use an alternative sample that contains detailed information on the credit lines initiated and used
by a random sample of 300 ﬁrms between 1996 and 2003. These data are drawn from Suﬁ (2009).
Using both LPC-Deal Scan and Suﬁ’s data sets, we measure the fraction of corporate liquidity that
is provided by lines of credit as the ratio of total credit lines to the sum of total credit lines plus cash.
For short, we call this variable LC-to-Cash ratio. As discussed by Suﬁ,w h i l es o m eﬁrms may have
higher demand for total liquidity due to variables such as better investment opportunities, the LC-to-
Cash ratio isolates the relative usage of lines of credit versus cash in corporate liquidity management.
Our main hypothesis states that a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk should be negatively related
to its LC-to-Cash. We measure this exposure using asset betas. While equity betas are easy to
compute using stock price data, they are mechanically related to leverage due to simple leverage
eﬀects (high leverage ﬁrms will tend to have larger betas). Since greater reliance on credit lines will
typically increase the ﬁrm’s leverage, the leverage eﬀect would then bias our estimates of the eﬀect of
betas on corporate liquidity management. To overcome this problem, we unlever equity betas in two
alternative ways. The simplest way to unlever betas is to use a model that backs out the “mechanical”
eﬀect of leverage, using for example, a Merton-KMV-type model for ﬁrm value. We call the set of
betas that we obtain using this method Beta KMV. The second way to unlever betas and variances is
to directly compute data on ﬁrm asset returns. Our data on this alternative beta measure come from
Choi (2009), who computes bond and bank loan returns and combines them with stock returns into
an asset return measure that uses relative market values of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial claims as weights.
We test the model’s central result by relating asset betas to LC-to-Cash ratios. Figure 3 below,
stock market index as a whole, documented by Bondarenko (2003), among others.
3which is based on industry-averages for the whole time period of 1987 to 2008, gives a visual illustra-
tion of our main result: exposure to systematic risk (asset betas) has a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by credit lines. To give a
concrete example, consider a comparison between the SIC 344 industry (Fabricated Metals) and SIC
367 (Electronic Components). The former industry is characterized by heavy reliance on credit lines
for liquidity management (average LC-to-Cash is 0.43 in our time period), while the latter shows
greater reliance on cash (LC-to-Cash =0 .18). These LC/cash choices correspond to the diﬀerences
in unlevered industry betas across the two industries. SIC 344 has an average Beta KMV of 0.83
in our time period, while SIC 367’s average asset beta equals 1.56.5 These liquidity patterns are
explained by the model we introduce in this paper.
We also run a battery of empirical speciﬁcations that control for other potential determinants
of the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by credit lines. First, similarly to Suﬁ (2009),
we use panel data to show that proﬁtable, large, low Q,l o wn e tw o r t hﬁrms are more likely to use
bank credit lines. These patterns hold both in the LPC-Deal Scan and also in Suﬁ’s data, indicating
that the large sample of line of credit usage that is based on LPC-Deal Scan has similar empirical
properties to the smaller, more detailed data constructed by Suﬁ.M o r ei m p o r t a n t l y ,w eﬁnd that
the relationship between aggregate risk and the choice between cash and credit lines holds after
controlling for total risk and the variables considered in previous work on credit lines. For example, in
our benchmark speciﬁcation (which uses Beta KMV and the LPC-Deal Scan proxy for LC-to-Cash),
we ﬁnd that an increase in asset beta from 0.8 to 1.5 (this is less than a one-standard deviation in beta
in our sample) decreases a ﬁrm’s reliance on credit lines by approximately 0.06 (approximately 15%
of the standard deviation and 20% of the average value of the LC-to-Cash variable in our sample).
The negative relationship between asset beta and LC-to-Cash holds for all diﬀerent proxies of
asset betas and line of credit usage that we employ. First, we show that this result also holds when
we use Suﬁ’s (2009) sample to calculate ﬁrms’ reliance on credit lines for liquidity management, both
for total and unused credit lines. Second, the results are also robust to variations in the methodology
used to compute betas, including Choi’s (2009) asset-return based betas, betas that are unlevered
using net rather than gross debt (to account for a possible eﬀect of cash on asset betas), “tail betas”
(that capture a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risks in bad times), and cash ﬂow-based betas (com-
puted by relating a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing needs to the aggregate ﬁnancing need in the entire universe of
ﬁrms in the sample).
We also provide evidence for the auxiliary implications of the model. First, we compute a ﬁrm’s
“bank beta” to test the model’s implication that a ﬁrm’s exposure to banking sector’s risks should
inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s liquidity policy. Our evidence suggests that ﬁrms that are more sensitive to
banking industry downturns are more likely to hold cash for liquidity management. Second, we sort
5These betas represent the 1987—2008 average, unlevered, value-weighted industry betas for the respective industries.
4ﬁrms according to observable proxies for ﬁnancing constraints to test whether the eﬀect of asset
beta on LC-to-Cash is driven by ﬁrms that are likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. The relationship
between asset beta and the usage of credit lines holds only in the “constrained” subsamples (e.g.,
those containing only small and low payout ﬁrms). Third, we examine whether the eﬀect of asset
beta on the choice between cash and credit lines increases during times when aggregate risk is likely
to matter the most. In particular, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of LC-to-Cash on betas
every year, and we relate the time series variation in the coeﬃcient to the level of aggregate risk, as
measured by VIX, the implied volatility of the stock market index returns from options data. VIX
captures both aggregate volatility, as well as the ﬁnancial sector’s appetite to bear that risk. The
results indicate that a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk matters most in times when VIX is high.
In our model, ﬁrms with high aggregate risk exposure hold more cash relative to lines of credit
since they face a higher cost of bank lines of credit compared to ﬁrms with low aggregate risk ex-
posure. To investigate this channel, we perform a ﬁnal important test. In particular, we study the
relationship between ﬁrms’ asset beta and the spreads that they commit to pay on bank lines of
credit. Indeed, we ﬁnd that high asset beta ﬁrms pay signiﬁcantly higher spreads when opening and
drawing on their credit lines, controlling for other deal terms and ﬁrm characteristics.
In addition to the literature discussed above, our paper is related to existing work on bank lending
during liquidity crises. Gatev and Strahan (2005) and Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2005), show
that when commercial paper to treasury bill spread widens, banks experience an inﬂow of deposits.
This, in turn, helps them to honor their loan commitments. The ﬂight of depositors to banks may
be due to banks having greater expertise in screening borrowers during stress times (cf. Kashyap,
Rajan, and Stein (2002)). Alternatively, the ﬂight to bank deposits may be explained by the FDIC
insurance (see Pennacchi (2006) for evidence). This line of research helps explain why banks are the
natural providers of liquidity insurance for the corporate sector. In particular, the ﬂight to bank
deposits in bad times may counteract the eﬀect of aggregate risk in liquidity management that we
identify. To address this, we conﬁrm that in times of high aggregate volatility (VIX), ﬁrm’s liquidity
management responds more to aggregate risk exposure, even after controlling for ﬂight to quality,
captured by a widening of the commercial paper (CP) to treasury bill spread. Our paper contributes
to this literature by pointing out to an important limitation of bank-provided liquidity insurance:
ﬁrms’ exposure to systematic risks.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our model and derive its em-
pirical implications. We present the empirical tests in Section 3. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
52M o d e l
Our model is based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006), who consider the role of
aggregate risk in aﬀecting corporate liquidity policy. We introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity in their frame-
work to analyze the trade-oﬀs between cash and credit lines.
The economy has a unit mass of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has access to an investment project that requires
ﬁxed investment I at date 0.6 The investment opportunity also requires an additional investment at
date 1, of uncertain size. This additional investment represents the ﬁrms’ liquidity need at date 1. We
assume that the date-1 investment need can be either equal to ρ, with probability λ,o r0,w i t hp r o b -
ability (1−λ). There is no discounting and everyone is risk-neutral, so that the discount factor is one.
Firms are symmetric in all aspects, with one important exception. They diﬀe ri nt h ee x t e n tt o
which their liquidity shocks are correlated with each other. A fraction θ of the ﬁrms has perfectly
correlated liquidity shocks; that is, they all either have a date-1 investment need, or not. We call
these ﬁrms systematic ﬁrms. The other fraction of ﬁrms (1 − θ) has independent investment needs;
that is, the probability that a ﬁrm needs ρ is independent of whether other ﬁrms need ρ or 0.T h e s e
are the non-systematic ﬁrms. We can think of this set up as one in which an aggregate state realizes
ﬁrst. The realized state then determines whether or not systematic ﬁrms have liquidity shocks.
We refer to states as follows. We let the aggregate state in which systematic ﬁrms have a liquidity
shock be denoted by λθ. Similarly, (1 − λθ) is the state in which systematic ﬁrms have no liquidity
demand. After the realization of this aggregate state, non-systematic ﬁrms learn whether they have
liquidity shocks. The state in which non-systematic ﬁrms do get a shock is denoted as λ and the
other state as (1−λ). Note that the likelihood of both λ and λθ states is λ. In other words, to avoid
additional notation, we denote states by their probability, but single out the state in which systematic
ﬁrms are all hit by a liquidity shock with the superscript θ. The set up is summarized in Figure 1.
− Figure 1 about here −
A ﬁrm will only continue its date-0 investment until date 2 if it can meet the date-1 liquidity
need. If the liquidity need is not met, then the ﬁrm is liquidated and the project produces a cash
ﬂow equal to zero. If the ﬁrm continues, the investment produces a date-2 cash ﬂow R which obtains
with probability p. With probability 1 − p, the investment produces nothing. The probability of
success depends on the input of speciﬁc human capital by the ﬁrms’ managers. If the managers
exert high eﬀort, the probability of success is equal to pG. Otherwise, the probability is pB, but the
managers consume a private beneﬁte q u a lt oB.W h i l et h ec a s hﬂow R is veriﬁable, the managerial
eﬀort and the private beneﬁta r en o tv e r i ﬁable and contractible. Because of the moral hazard due
this private beneﬁt, managers must keep a high enough stake in the project to be induced to exert
6In Tirole (2006), the ﬁr mh a sd a t e - 0w e a l t hA but this plays no signiﬁcant role in our model. Hence, we have set
it equal to zero.
6eﬀort. We assume that the investment is negative NPV if the managers do not exert eﬀort, implying
the following incentive constraint:





where RM is the managers’ compensation and ∆p = pG − pB. This moral hazard problem im-
plies that the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows cannot be pledged in their entirety to outside investors. Following
Holmstrom and Tirole, we deﬁne:
ρ0 ≡ pG(R −
B
∆p
) < ρ1 ≡ pGR.( 2 )
The parameter ρ0 represents the investment’s pledgeable income, and ρ1 its total expected payoﬀ.
In addition, we assume that the project can be partially liquidated at date 1. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm
can choose to continue only a fraction x<1 of its investment project, in which case (in its liquidity
shock state, λ or λθ) it requires a date-1 investment of xρ. It then produces total expected cash ﬂow
equal to xρ1, and pledgeable income equal to xρ0. In other words, the project can be linearly scaled
down at date 1.
We make the following assumption:
ρ0 < ρ < ρ1.( 3 )
The assumption that ρ < ρ1 implies that the eﬃcient level of x is xFB =1 .H o w e v e r , t h e ﬁrm’s
pledgeable income is lower than the liquidity shock. This might force the ﬁrm to liquidate some of its
projects and thus have x∗ < 1 in equilibrium. In particular, in the absence of liquidity management
we would have x∗ =0(since xρ >x ρ0 for all positive x). In particular, ﬁrms have a shortfall equal
to x(ρ − ρ0) when hit by a liquidity shock. For each x,t h e yc a nr a i s exρ0 in the market at date-1.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole, we assume that the ﬁrm can fully dilute the date-0 investors at date-1.
In other words, the ﬁrm can issue securities that are senior to the date-0 claim to ﬁnance a part of
the required investment xρ (alternatively, we can assume eﬃcient renegotiation of the date-0 claim).
Finally, we assume that even when x =1 , each project produces enough pledgeable income to
ﬁnance the initial investment I, and the date-1 investment ρ:
I<(1 − λ)ρ0 + λ(ρ0 − ρ).( 4 )
In particular, notice that this implies that (1 − λ)ρ0 > λ(ρ − ρ0).
2.1 Solution using credit lines
We assume that the economy has a single, large intermediary who will manage liquidity for all ﬁrms
( “ t h eb a n k ” )b yo ﬀering lines of credit. The credit line works as follows. The ﬁrm commits to
7making a payment to the bank in states of the world in which liquidity is not needed. We denote
this payment (“commitment fee”) by y. In return, the bank commits to lending to the ﬁrm at a
pre-speciﬁed interest rate, up to a maximum limit. We denote the maximum size of the line by w.
In addition, the bank lends enough money (I)t ot h eﬁrms at date 0 so that they can start their
projects, in exchange for a promised date-2 debt payment D.
To ﬁx ideas, let us imagine for now that ﬁrms have zero cash holdings. In the next section we
will allow ﬁrms to both hold cash, and also open bank credit lines.
In order for the credit line to allow ﬁrms to invest up to amount x in state λ, it must be that:
w(x) ≥ x(ρ − ρ0).( 5 )
In return, in state (1−λ),t h eﬁnancial intermediary can receive up to the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income,
either through the date-1 commitment fee y, or through the date-2 payment D.W et h u sh a v et h e
budget constraint:
y + pGD ≤ ρ0.( 6 )
The intermediary’s break even constraint is:
I + λx(ρ − ρ0) ≤ (1 − λ)ρ0.( 7 )
Finally, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is:
U(x)=( 1− λ)ρ1 + λ(ρ1 − ρ)x − I.( 8 )
Given assumption (4), equation (7) will be satisﬁed by x =1 , and thus the credit line allows ﬁrms
to achieve the ﬁrst-best investment policy.
The potential problem with the credit line is adequacy of bank liquidity. To provide liquidity for
the entire corporate sector, the intermediary must have enough available funds in all states of the
world. Since a fraction θ of ﬁrms will always demand liquidity in the same state, it is possible that
the intermediary will run out of funds in the bad aggregate state. In order to see this, notice that
in order obtain x =1in state λθ, the following inequality must be obeyed:
(1 − θ)(1 − λ)ρ0 ≥ [θ +( 1− θ)λ](ρ − ρ0).( 9 )
The left-hand side represents the total pledgeable income that the intermediary has in that state,
coming from the non-systematic ﬁrms that do not have liquidity needs. The right-hand side rep-
resents the economy’s total liquidity needs, from the systematic ﬁrms and from the fraction of
non-systematic ﬁrms that have liquidity needs. Clearly, from (4) there will be a θmax > 0,s u c ht h a t
this condition is met for all θ < θmax. This leads to an intuitive result:
8Proposition 1 The intermediary solution with lines of credit achieves the ﬁrst-best investment pol-





2.2 The choice between cash and credit lines
We now allow ﬁrms to hold both cash and open credit lines, and analyze the properties of the
equilibria that obtain for diﬀerent parameter values. Analyzing this trade-oﬀ constitutes the most
important and novel contribution of our paper.
2.2.1 Firms’ optimization problem
In order to characterize the diﬀerent equilibria, we start by introducing some notation. We let Lθ
(alternatively, L1−θ) represent the liquidity demand by systematic (non-systematic) ﬁrms. Similarly,
xθ (x1−θ) represents the investment level that systematic (non-systematic) ﬁrms can achieve in equi-
librium (under their preferred liquidity policy). In addition, the credit line contracts that are oﬀered
by the bank can also diﬀer across ﬁrm types. That is, we assume that a ﬁrm’s type is observable
by the bank at the time of contracting. This assumption implies that the credit line contract is also
indexed by ﬁrm type; speciﬁcally, (Dθ,wθ,yθ) represents the contract oﬀered to systematic ﬁrms
and (D1−θ,w1−θ,y1−θ) represents the contract oﬀered to non-systematic ﬁrms. For now, we assume
that the bank cannot itself carry liquid funds and explain later why this is in fact the equilibrium
outcome in the model.
Firms will optimize their payoﬀ subject to the constraint that they must be able to ﬁnance the
initial investment I, and the continuation investment x. In addition, the bank must break even. For
each ﬁrm type i =( θ,1 − θ), the relevant constraints can be written as:
wi + Li = xi(ρ − ρ0) (11)
I + qLi + λwi =( 1 − λ)(Li + yi + pGDi)
yi + pGDi ≤ ρ0.
The ﬁrst equation ensures that the ﬁrm can ﬁnance the continuation investment level xi, given its
liquidity policy (wi,L i). The second equation is the bank break-even constraint. The bank provides
ﬁnancing for the initial investment and the liquid holdings qLi, and in addition provides ﬁnancing
through the credit line in state λ (equal to wi). In exchange, the bank receives the sum of the
ﬁrm’s liquid holdings, the credit line commitment fee, and the date-2 debt payment Di.T h et h i r d
inequality guarantees that the ﬁrm has enough pledgeable income to make the payment yi + pGDi
in the state when it is not hit by the liquidity shock.
9In addition to the break-even constraint, the bank must have enough liquidity to honor its credit
line commitments, in both aggregate states. As explained above, this constraint can bind in state
λθ, in which all systematic ﬁrms may demand liquidity. Each systematic ﬁrm demands liquidity
equal to xθ(ρ−ρ0)−Lθ,a n dt h e r ei sam a s sθ of such ﬁrms. In addition, non-systematic ﬁrms that
do not have an investment need demand liquidity equal to x1−θ(ρ − ρ0) − L1−θ.T h e r ea r e(1 − θ)λ
such ﬁrms. To honor its credit lines, the bank can draw on the liquidity provided by the fraction of
non-systematic ﬁrms that does not need liquidity, a mass equal to (1−θ)(1−λ). The bank receives a
payment equal to L1−θ+y1−θ+pGD1−θ from each of them, a payment that cannot exceed L1−θ+ρ0.
Thus, the bank’s liquidity constraint requires that:
θ[xθ(ρ − ρ0) − Lθ]+( 1− θ)λ[x1−θ(ρ − ρ0) − L1−θ] ≤ (1 − θ)(1 − λ)[L1−θ + ρ0].( 1 2 )
As will become clear below, this inequality will impose a constraint on the maximum size of the
credit line that is available to systematic ﬁrms. For now, we write this constraint as follows:
wθ ≤ wmax.( 1 3 )
We can collapse the constraints in (11) into a single constraint, and thus write the ﬁrm’s opti-
mization problem as follows:
max
xi,Li Ui =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λ(ρ1 − ρ)xi − (q − 1)Li − I s.t. (14)
I +( q − 1)Li + λxiρ ≤ (1 − λ)ρ0 + λxiρ0
wθ ≤ wmax
This optimization problem determines ﬁrms’ optimal cash holdings and continuation investment,
which we write as a function of the liquidity premium, Li(q) and xi(q). In equilibrium, the total
demand from cash coming from systematic and non-systematic ﬁrms cannot exceed the supply of
liquid funds:
θLθ(q)+( 1− θ)L1−θ(q) ≤ Ls.( 1 5 )
This equilibrium condition determines the cost of holding cash, q. We denote the equilibrium price
by q∗.
2.2.2 Optimal ﬁrm policies
The ﬁrst point to notice is that non-systematic ﬁrms will never ﬁnd it optimal to hold cash. In the
optimization problem (14), ﬁrms’ payoﬀs decrease with cash holdings Li if q∗ > 1, and they are
independent of Li if q∗ =1 . Thus, the only situation in which a ﬁrm might ﬁnd it optimal to hold
cash is when the constraint xθ(ρ − ρ0) − Lθ ≤ wmax is binding. But this constraint can only bind
for systematic ﬁrms.
10Notice also that if Li =0the solution of the optimization problem (14) is xi =1(the eﬃcient
investment policy). Thus, non-systematic ﬁrms always invest optimally, x1−θ =1 .
Given that non-systematic ﬁrms use credit lines to manage liquidity and invest optimally, we can
rewrite constraint (12) in simpler form as:
θ[xθ(ρ − ρ0) − Lθ]+( 1− θ)λ(ρ − ρ0) ≤ (1 − θ)(1 − λ)ρ0,o r ( 1 6 )
xθ(ρ − ρ0) − Lθ ≤
(1 − θ)(ρ0 − λρ)
θ
≡ wmax.
Thus, the maximum size of the credit line for systematic ﬁrms is wmax =
(1−θ)(ρ0−λρ)
θ .T h et e r m
(1−θ)(ρ0−λρ) represents the total amount of excess liquidity that is available from non-systematic
ﬁrms in state λθ. By equation (4), this is positive. The bank can then allocate this excess liquidity
to the fraction θ of ﬁrms that are systematic.
Lemma 1 states the optimal policy of systematic ﬁrms, which we prove in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Investment policy of systematic ﬁrms, xθ, depends upon the liquidity premium, q,a s
follows:
1. If ρ − ρ0 ≤ wmax,t h e nxθ(q)=1for all q.
2. If ρ − ρ0 >w max,d e ﬁne two threshold values of q, q1 and q2 as follows:
q1 =1+
ρ0 − λρ − I






xθ(q)=1 if q ≤ min(q1,q 2) (19)
=
(1 − λ)ρ0 − I +( q − 1)wmax
(λ + q − 1)(ρ − ρ0)
if q2 ≥ q>q 1
∈ [0,1] (indiﬀerence over entire range) if q1 >q= q2
=0 if q>q 2.
In words, systematic ﬁrms will invest eﬃciently if their total liquidity demand (ρ − ρ0)c a nb e
satisﬁed by credit lines (of maximum size wmax), or if the cost of holding cash q is low enough. If
the maximum available credit line is low, and the cost of carrying cash is high, then systematic ﬁrms
will optimally reduce their optimal continuation investment (xθ < 1). If the cost of carrying cash is
high enough, then systematic ﬁrms may need to fully liquidate their projects (xθ =0 ).
11Given the optimal investment in Lemma 1, the demand for cash is given by Lθ(q)=0if ρ−ρ0 ≤
wmax, and by the following condition
Lθ(xθ)=xθ(ρ − ρ0) − wmax,( 2 0 )
when ρ − ρ0 >w max, for the optimal xθ(q) in Lemma 1.
2.2.3 Equilibria
The particular equilibrium that obtains in the model will depend on the fraction of systematic ﬁrms
in the economy (θ), and the supply of liquid funds (Ls).
First, notice that if ρ − ρ0 ≤ wmax (that is, if the fraction of systematic ﬁrms in the economy
is small, (θ ≤ θmax), then there is no cash demand and the equilibrium liquidity premium is zero
(q∗ =1 ). Firms use credit lines to manage liquidity and they invest eﬃciently (xθ = x1−θ =1 ).
On the ﬂip side, if ρ−ρ0 >w max (that is, θ > θmax), then systematic ﬁrms will need to use cash
in equilibrium. Equilibrium requires that the demand for cash does not exceed supply:
θLθ(q)=θ[xθ(q)(ρ − ρ0) − wmax] ≤ Ls. (21)
Given this equilibrium condition, we can ﬁnd the minimum level of liquidity supply Ls, such that
systematic ﬁrms can sustain an eﬃcient investment policy, xθ(q)=1 .T h i si sg i v e nb y :
θ[(ρ − ρ0) − wmax]=Ls
1(θ). (22)
If Ls ≥ Ls
1(θ),t h e ns y s t e m a t i cﬁrms invest eﬃciently, xθ =1 , demand a credit line equal to
wmax, and have cash holdings equal to Lθ =( ρ − ρ0) − wmax. The equilibrium liquidity premium is
zero, q∗ =1 .
When Ls drops below Ls
1(θ), then the cash demand by systematic ﬁrms must fall to make it
compatible with supply. This is accomplished by an increase in the liquidity premium that reduces
cash demand. In equilibrium, we have q∗ > 1, xθ(q∗) < 1, and equation (21) holding with equality
(such that the demand for cash equals the reduced supply):7
θ[xθ(q∗)(ρ − ρ0) − wmax]=Ls.( 2 3 )
2.3 Summary of results
We summarize the model’s results in form of the following detailed proposition:
Proposition 2 When ﬁrms can choose between both cash holdings and bank-provided lines of credit,
the following equilibria are possible depending on the extent of aggregate risk and the supply of liquid
assets in the economy:
7There are two cases to consider here, depending on whether q1 is higher or lower than q2. Please see the appendix
for deatils.
121. If the amount of systematic risk in the economy is low (θ ≤ θmax), where θmax is as given
in Proposition 1, then all ﬁrms can use credit lines to manage their liquidity. They invest
eﬃciently and credit line contracts are independent of ﬁrms’ exposure to systematic risk.
2. If the amount of systematic risk in the economy is high (θ > θmax), then ﬁrms that have
more exposure to systematic risk will be more likely to hold cash (relative to credit lines) in
their liquidity management. The bank’s liquidityc o n s t r a i n tr e q u i r e st h a tc r e d i tl i n ec o n t r a c t s
discriminate between idiosyncratic and systematic risk. There are two sub-cases to consider,
which vary according to the supply of liquid assets in the economy (see Figure 2 for the case
when q1 <q 2):
(a) If the supply of liquid assets is higher than a minimum cutoﬀ Ls
1(θ) deﬁned by Ls
1(θ)=
θ[(ρ − ρ0) − wmax(θ)] and wmax(θ)=
(1−θ)(ρ0−λρ)
θ , then in equilibrium all ﬁrms invest
eﬃciently (irrespective of their exposure to systematic risk), and there is no liquidity
premium. Firms use both cash and credit lines to manage systematic risk, and they use
credit lines to manage idiosyncratic risk.
(b) If the supply of liquid assets is lower than Ls
1(θ), then systematic liquidity risk generates
a liquidity premium and investment distortions. Firms that have greater exposure to
systematic risk hold more cash, and under-invest in the event of a liquidity shock.
− Figure 2 about here −
In all of these situations, there is no role for cash held inside the intermediary. In equilibrium,
cash is held only to manage systematic risk. Thus, ﬁrms gain no diversiﬁcation beneﬁts by deposit-
ing the cash with the intermediary (they all need the cash in the same state of the world, and so
the intermediary must carry the same amount of cash that the ﬁrms do). Firms would beneﬁtf r o m
diversiﬁcation when managing non-systematic risk, but for that they are always better oﬀ using the
credit line (which does not involve a liquidity premium).
2.4 Empirical implications
The model generates the following implications, which we examine in the next section.
1. A ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk is an important determinant of whether it manages its
future liquidity needs through cash reserves or bank-provided lines of credit. In particular, an
increase in a ﬁrm’s exposure to aggregate risk should increase its propensity to use cash for
corporate liquidity management, relative to credit lines. We test this prediction by relating the
fraction of total corporate liquidity that is held in the form of credit lines to a ﬁrm’s asset beta.
132. The trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines becomes more important as the amount of system-
atic risk in the economy increases. Following previous research, we test this implication by
examining whether the eﬀect of asset beta on the choice between cash and credit lines increases
in times of high aggregate risk. We measure aggregate risk using VIX, the implied volatility
of the stock market index returns from options data. VIX captures both aggregate volatility,
as well as the ﬁnancial sector’s appetite to bear that risk.
3. The trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines is more important for ﬁrms that ﬁnd it more costly
to raise external capital. In the absence of ﬁnancing constraints there is no role for corporate
liquidity policy, thus the choice between cash and credit lines becomes irrelevant. We test this
model implication by sorting ﬁrms according to observable proxies for ﬁnancing constraints,
and examining whether the eﬀect of asset beta on the choice between cash and credit lines is
driven by ﬁrms that are likely to be ﬁnancially constrained.
4. A ﬁrm’s exposure to risks that are systematic to the banking industry is particularly important
for the determination of its liquidity policy. In the model, bank systematic risk has a one-to-one
relation with ﬁrm systematic risk, given that there is only one source of risk in the economy
(ﬁrms’ liquidity shock). However, one might imagine that in reality banks face other sources
of systematic risk (coming, for example, from consumers’ liquidity demand) and that ﬁrms are
diﬀerentially exposed to such risks. Accordingly, a “ﬁrm-bank asset beta” should also drive
corporate liquidity policy. Firms that are more sensitive to banking industry downturns should
be more likely to hold cash for liquidity management.
5. Firms with higher systematic risk exposure should face worse contractual terms when raising
bank credit lines. In the model, if the amount of systematic risk in the economy is high, then
the bank’s liquidity constraint requires that credit line contracts discriminate between idio-
syncratic and systematic risk. In particular, systematic ﬁrms should face worse contractual
terms since they are the ones that drive the bank’s liquidity constraint. One diﬃculty with
testing this implication is that there are several contractual dimensions that could be used by
the bank to separate ﬁrms, including quantity constraints, spreads, maturity, and covenants.
With this caveat in mind, we test this implication by relating asset beta to credit spreads, after
controlling for ﬁrm characteristics and other contractual terms. Given the endogeneity of the
control variables, this evidence should be interpreted as suggestive rather than conclusive.8
8Our model has the additional empirical implication that the liquidity risk premium is higher when there is an
economic downturn since in such times there is greater aggregate risk and lines of credit become more expensive. This
is similar to the result of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), but in their model, the eﬀect arises from the fact that ﬁrms’
cash ﬂows are lower in economic downturns and they are less naturally hedged against future liquidity needs.
143 Empirical tests
3.1 Sample selection criteria
The main implication of our model is that ﬁrms are more likely to use cash in their liquidity man-
agement if they are subject to a greater amount of systematic risk. We use two alternative sources
to construct our line of credit data. Our ﬁr s ts a m p l e( w h i c hw ec a l lLPC Sample)i sd r a w nf r o m
LPC-Deal Scan. These data allow us to construct a large sample of credit line initiations. We note,
however, that the LPC-Deal Scan data have two potential drawbacks. First, they are mostly based
on syndicated loans, thus are potentially biased towards large deals and consequently towards large
ﬁrms. Second, they do not allow us to measure line of credit drawdowns (the fraction of existing
lines that has been used in the past). To overcome these issues, we also construct an alternative
sample that contains detailed information on the credit lines initiated and used by a random sample
of 300 COMPUSTAT ﬁrms. These data are provided by Amir Suﬁ on his website and were used on
Suﬁ (2009). We call this sample Random Sample.U s i n gt h e s ed a t ar e d u c e st h es a m p l es i z ef o ro u r
tests. We regard these two samples as providing complementary information on the usage of credit
lines for the purposes of this paper. In addition, this allows us to document that several previously
reported patterns prevail in both samples.
To construct the LPC Sample, we start from a sample of loans in LPC-Deal Scan in the period of
1987 to 2008 for which we can obtain the ﬁrm identiﬁer gvkey (which we later use to match to COM-
PUSTAT).9 We drop utilities, quasi-public and ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the sample (SIC codes greater
than 5999 and lower than 7000, greater than 4899 and lower than 5000, and greater than 8999). We
consider only short term and long term credit lines, which are deﬁned as those that have the LPC
ﬁeld “loantype”e q u a lt o“ 364-day Facility,” “Revolver/Line < 1Y r ,” “Revolver/Line >=1Y r ,”
or “Revolver/Line.” We drop loans that appear to be repeated (same gvkey and loan_id). In some
cases, the same ﬁrm has more than one credit line initiation in the same quarter. In these cases, we
sum the facility amounts (the total available credit in each line) for each ﬁrm-quarter, and average
the other variables using the facility amount as weights. We let LCi,t denote the total value of credit
lines initiated in quarter t by ﬁrm i,a n dl e tMaturityi,t denote the average maturity of these lines
in quarters. We also collect data on the spreads paid by ﬁrms when raising these lines. All-in drawn
spread captures the total (fees and interests) annual spread paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn
down from the facility. Undrawn spread is the total (fees and interest) annual spread over LIBOR,
for each dollar available under commitment. This sample is then matched to COMPUSTAT annual
data, as described below.
To construct the Random Sample,w es t a r tf r o mt h es a m p l eu s e di nS u ﬁ (2009), which contains
9We use several procedures to obtain gvkeys, including a ﬁle provided by Michael Roberts, which was used in Chava
and Roberts (2008), ﬁrm tickers (which are available in LPC), and manual matching using ﬁrm names.
151,908 ﬁrm-years (300 ﬁrms) between 1996 and 2003. Suﬁ’s data set includes information on the
total credit line facilities available to ﬁrm j in the random sample during an year t between 1996 to
2003 (Total Line j,t), and the amount of credit in these lines that is still available to ﬁrm j in year t
(Unused Linej,t). We use this information to construct our proxies for credit line usage. These data
are then matched to annual data from COMPUSTAT.
Finally, we merge these data with data on ﬁrm-level betas and stock-price based volatility mea-
sures. These data are described in more detail below.
3.2 Variable deﬁnitions
Our tests combine data that comes from multiple sources. It is useful to explain in detail how we
construct our variables.
3.2.1 COMPUSTAT variables
We follow Suﬁ (2009) in the deﬁnitions of the variables that we use for our credit line tests. We
use a book asset measure that deducts the amount of cash holdings, that is, ﬁrm Assets are deﬁned
as at — che. The other COMPUSTAT-based variables that we examine in our tests are deﬁned as
follows (in terms of annual COMPUSTAT ﬁelds). Cash is given by che. Tangibility is equal to ppent
scaled by assets. Size is deﬁned as the log of assets. Q is deﬁned as a cash-adjusted, market-to-book
asset ratio, (Assets + prcc_fc×s h o—c e q )/Assets.10 NetWorth is deﬁned as (ceq — che)/Assets.
Proﬁtability is the ratio of EBITDA over assets. Age is measured as the diﬀerence between the
current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared in COMPUSTAT. Industry sales volatility
(IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of the within-year standard deviation of
quarterly changes in ﬁrm sales (saleq minus its lagged value) scaled by the average asset value (atq)
in the year. Proﬁt volatility (ProﬁtVol)i st h eﬁrm-level standard deviation of annual changes in the
level of EBITDA, calculated using four lags, and scaled by average assets in the lagged period. We
winsorize all COMPUSTAT variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
3.2.2 Line of credit data
When using Random Sample, we measure the fraction of total corporate liquidity that is provided
by credit lines for ﬁrm i in year t using both total and unused credit lines:
Total LC-to-Cash i,t =
Total Linei,t
Total Linei,t + Cashi,t
,( 2 4 )
Unused LC-to-Cashi,t =
Unused Linei,t
Unused Linei,t + Cashi,t
.( 2 5 )
10Suﬁ (2009) also deducts deferred taxes from the numerator. We excluded deferred taxes from this calculation
because including it causes a signiﬁcant drop in the number of observations when using sample B.
16As discussed by Suﬁ,w h i l es o m eﬁrms may have higher demand for total liquidity due to better
investment opportunities, these LC-to-Cash ratios should isolate the relative usage of lines of credit
versus cash in corporate liquidity management.
When using LPC Sample, we construct a proxy for line of credit usage in the following way.
For each ﬁrm-quarter, we measure credit line availability at date t by summing all existing credit
lines that have not yet matured. This calculation assumes that LCs remain open until they mature.




LCj,tΓ(Maturityj,t ≥ s − t),( 2 6 )
where Γ(.) represents the indicator function, and the variables LC and Maturity are deﬁned above.
We convert these ﬁrm-quarter measures into ﬁrm-year measures by computing the average value of
Total LC in each year. We then measure the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by
investment-related lines of credit for ﬁrm j in quarter s using the following variable:
LC-to-Cashj,t =
Total LCj,t
Total LCj,t + Cashj,t
.( 2 7 )
This ratio is closely related to the Total LC-to-Cash ratio of equation (24).
3.2.3 Data on betas and volatilities
We measure ﬁrms’ exposure to systematic risk using asset (unlevered) betas.11 While equity betas
are easy to compute using stock price data, they are mechanically related to leverage: high leverage
ﬁrms will tend to have larger betas. Because greater reliance on credit lines will typically increase the
ﬁrm’s leverage, the leverage eﬀect would then bias our estimates of the eﬀect of betas on corporate
liquidity management.
To overcome this problem, we unlever equity betas in two alternative ways. The simplest way to
unlever betas is to use a model that backs out the “mechanical” eﬀect of leverage, using for example
a Merton-KMV type model for ﬁrm value. Our ﬁrst set of betas is computed using such a model,
starting from yearly equity betas that are estimated using the past 12 monthly stock returns for
each ﬁrm (using CRSP data). To compute the face value of debt for each ﬁrm, we use the ﬁrm’s
total book value of short-term debt plus one-half of the book value of long-term debt.12 We call the
set of betas that we obtain using this method Beta KMV. We also compute a measure of total asset
volatility, which is used as a control in some of the regressions below. This measure (denoted Var
KMV) is estimated yearly using the past 12 monthly stock returns and the KMV-Merton model.
The second way to unlever betas and variances is to directly compute data on ﬁrm asset returns.
The data we use come from Choi (2009). Choi computes bond and bank loan returns using several
11Similar to the COMPUSTAT data items, all measures of beta described below are winsorized at a 5% level.
12This is a knwon rule-of-thumb used to ﬁt a KMV-type model to an annual horizon.
17data sources and then combines them with stock returns into an asset return measure that uses rela-
tive market values of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial claims as weights. The ﬁrm-level asset return measure is
then used to compute annual betas against the aggregate equity market. We call this beta measure
Beta Asset, and the associated return variance measure Var Asset. Given the stricter requirements
(including some proprietary information), these data are only available for a subset of our ﬁrms.13
Because of data availability, we use Beta KMV as our benchmark measure of beta, but we verify
that the results are robust to the use of this alternative unlevering method.
One potential concern with theses beta measures is that they may be mechanically inﬂuenced
by a ﬁrm’s cash holdings. Since corporate cash holdings are typically held in the form of riskless
securities, high cash ﬁrms could have lower asset betas. Notice that this possibility would make it
less likely for us to ﬁnd a positive relationship between asset betas and cash. However, we also verify
whether this eﬀect has a signiﬁcant bearing on our results by computing KMV-type asset betas that
are unlevered using net debt (e.g., debt minus cash) rather than gross debt. We call this variable Beta
Cash, which is computed at the level of the industry to further mitigate endogeneity. Speciﬁcally,
we measure Beta Cash as the median cash-adjusted asset beta in the ﬁrm’s 3-digit SIC industry.
We also compute a ﬁrm’s “bank beta” (which we call Beta Bank) to test the model’s implication
that a ﬁrm’s exposure to banking sector’s risks should inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s liquidity policy. We com-
pute this beta by unlevering the ﬁrm’s equity beta relative to an index of bank stock returns, which
is computed using a value-weighted average of the stock returns of all banks that are present in the
LPC-Deal Scan database. We use the LPC banks to compute the aggregate bank stock return to
ensure that our measure of the banking sector’s risk captures a risk that is relevant for the ﬁrms in
our sample.
In the model, a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risks matters mostly on the downside (because a
ﬁr mm a yn e e dl i q u i d i t yw h e no t h e rﬁrms are likely to be in trouble). To capture a ﬁrm’s exposure to
large negative shocks, we follow Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) and compute
the ﬁrm’s Tail Beta.T h eﬁrm’s tail beta is deﬁned as the ratio of Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES)
of a ﬁrm, divided by Expected Shortfall (ES) of the market, where MES is the average percentage
loss suﬀered by a ﬁrm on days when the CRSP value-weighted market return is in its worst 5% days
in the previous year, and ES is the average percentage loss suﬀered by the market on those same
days. MES is a common risk measure used by ﬁrms for enterprise-wide risk aggregation. This beta
is then unlevered using the same procedure used to compute Beta KMV.
All of the betas described above are computed using market prices. Using market data is desirable
because of their high frequency. However, the model’s argument is based on the correlation between a
ﬁrm’s liquidity needs (the diﬀerence between required investments and pledgeable cash ﬂows) and the
liquidity need for the overall economy (which aﬀects the banking sector’s ability to provide liquidity).
13We refer the reader to Choi’s original paper for further details on the construction of Beta Asset.
18While market-based betas should capture this correlation, it is desirable to verify whether a beta that
is based more directly on cash ﬂows and investment also contains information about ﬁrm’s choices
b e t w e e nc a s ha n dc r e d i tl i n e s . 14 In order to do this, we compute each ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing gap beta (Beta
Gap)i nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y .I ne a c hy e a r ,w ec o m p u t eaﬁrm’s ﬁnancing gap at the level of the 3-digit
SIC industry by taking the diﬀerence between total industry investment and total industry cash ﬂow,
scaled by assets (at).15 Then we compute the beta of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing gap with respect to the ag-
gregate ﬁnancing gap (the diﬀerence between investment and cash ﬂo w sf o rt h ee n t i r eC O M P U S T A T
s a m p l e ) ,u s i n g1 0y e a r so fd a t a .W ed e ﬁne the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing gap at the industry gap to mitigate
the endogeneity of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment, and to reduce the error in measuring the gap betas.16
One shortcoming of the measures of systematic risk that we construct is that they are noisy
and prone to measurement error. While this problem cannot be fully resolved, it can be amelio-
rated by adopting a strategy dealing with classical errors-in-variables. We follow the traditional
Griliches and Hausman (1986) approach to measurement problem and instrument the endogenous
variable (our beta proxy) with lags of itself. We experimented with alternative lag structures and
chose a parsimonious form that satisﬁes the restriction conditions needed to validate the approach.17
Throughout the tests performed below, we report auxiliary statistics that speak to the relevance
(ﬁrst-stage F-tests) and validity (Hansen’s J-stats) of our instrumental variables regressions.
3.3 Empirical tests and results
3.3.1 Summary statistics
We start by summarizing our data in Table 1. Panel A reports summary statistics for the LPC-Deal
Scan sample (for ﬁrm-years in which Beta KMV data are available), and Panel B uses Suﬁ’s sample.
Notice that the size of the sample in Panel A is much larger, and that the data for Beta Asset are
available only for approximately one third of the ﬁrm-years for which Beta KMV data are available.
As expected, the average values of asset betas are very close to each other, with average values close
to one. The two alternative measures of variance also appear to be very close to each other.
− Table 1 about here −
Comparing Panel A and Panel B, notice that the distribution for most of the variables is very
similar across the two samples. The main diﬀerence between the two samples is that the LPC-Deal
Scan data is biased towards large ﬁrms (as discussed above). For example, median assets are equal
to 270 million in LPC Sample,a n d116 million in Random Sample. Consistent with this diﬀerence,
14We thank Ran Duchin for suggesting this analysis.
15We use Compustat item capx to measure investment (ib), and deﬁne cash ﬂow as earnings before extraordinary
items (ib).
16We restrict the sample to industry-years with at least 15 ﬁrms, to further improve measurement.
17An alternative way to address measurement error is to compute betas at a “portfolio”, rather than at a ﬁrm-level.
We explore this idea as well, by using industry betas rather than ﬁrm-level betas in some speciﬁcations below.
19the ﬁrms in LPC Sample are also older, and have higher average Qs and EBITDA volatility. The
m e a s u r eo fl i n eo fc r e d i ta v a i l a b i l i t yi nLPC Sample (LC-to-Cash) is lower than those in Random
Sample (Total LC-to-Cash and Unused LC-to-Cash). For example, the average value of LC-to-Cash
in LPC Sample is 0.33, while the average value of Total LC-to-Cash is 0.51.T h i sd i ﬀerence reﬂects
the fact that LPC-Deal Scan may fail to report some credit lines that are available in Suﬁ’s data,
though it could also reﬂect the diﬀerent sample compositions.
In Table 2, we examine the correlation among the diﬀe r e n tb e t a st h a tw eu s ei nt h i ss t u d y .W e
also include the asset volatility proxies (Var KMV and Var Asset). Not surprisingly, all the beta
proxies that are based on asset return data are highly correlated. The lowest correlations are those
between Beta Gap and the asset-return based betas (approximately 0.10). The correlations among
the other betas (all of them based on asset return data) hover between 0.4 and 0.9.
− Table 2 about here −
To examine the eﬀect of aggregate risk on the choice between cash and credit lines, we perform
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent sets of tests. We describe these tests in turn.
3.3.2 Industry analysis
To provide a visual illustration of the eﬀect of betas on corporate liquidity management, we plot
in Figure 3 the average industry value for LC-to-Cash for our entire time period of 1987 to 2008,
against average (value-weighted) industry asset betas (using Beta KMV).18 The ﬁgure depicts a
strong negative relation between asset betas and the usage of credit lines. The eﬀect of beta on
liquidity management also appears to be economically signiﬁcant. To give a concrete example,
consider a comparison between the SIC 344 industry (Fabricated Metals) and SIC 367 (Electronic
Components). The former industry is characterized by heavy reliance on credit lines for liquidity
management (average LC-to-Cash is 0.43 in our time period), while the latter shows greater reliance
on cash (LC-to-Cash =0 .18). These LC/cash choices correspond to the diﬀerences in unlevered
industry betas across the two industries. SIC 344 has an average Beta KMV of 0.83 in our time
period, while SIC 367’s average asset beta equals 1.56. We also report the output of a simple
regression of LC-to-Cash on Beta KMV. This regression slope is −0.09,s i g n i ﬁcant at a 1% level (t-
stat = −2.76). This empirical relation supports the implications of the model developed in Section 2.
− Figure 3 about here −
18Below, we also examine whether the industry betas depicted in Figure 3 are correlated with LC-to-Cash after
controlling for other ﬁrm-level determinants of liquidity management.
203.3.3 Firm-level regressions
The plot in Figure 3 uses raw data and thus does not address the possibility that the relation be-
tween aggregate risk and line of credit may be driven by other variables. For example, the evidence
in Suﬁ (2009) suggests that risky ﬁrms (equivalent to ProﬁtVol above) are less likely to use credit
lines. Since betas are correlated with total risk, it is important to show that the relation between
beta and credit line usage remains after controlling for risk.
Our benchmark empirical speciﬁcation closely follows of Suﬁ (2009). We add to his regression
by including our measure of systematic risk:
LC-to-Cashi,t = α + β1BetaKMV i,t + β2 ln(Age)i,t + β3(Proﬁtability)i,t−1 (28)
+β4Sizei,t−1 + β5Qi,t−1 + β6Networthi,t−1 + β7IndSalesVolj,t
+β8ProﬁtVo l i,t +
X
t
Ye a r t + ²i,t,
where Year absorbs time-speciﬁce ﬀects, respectively. Our model predicts that the coeﬃcient β1
should be negative. We also run the same regression replacing Beta KMV with our other proxies
for a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk (see Section 3.2.3). And we use diﬀerent proxies for LC-to-
Cash, which are based both on LPC-Deal Scan and Suﬁ’s data. In some speciﬁcations we also include
industry dummies (following Suﬁ we use 1-digit SIC industry dummies in our empirical models) and
the variance measures that are based on stock and asset returns (Var KMV and Var Asset).
The results for the Beta KMV and LPC-Deal Scan data are presented in Table 3. In column
(1), we replicate Suﬁ’s (2009) results (see his Table 3). Just like Suﬁ,w eﬁnd that proﬁtable, large,
low Q,l o wn e tw o r t h ,s e a s o n a lﬁrms are more likely to use bank credit lines. This is particularly
important given the fact that our dependent variable is not as precisely measured as that in Suﬁ.
In column (2) we introduce our measure of systematic risk and ﬁnd that the choice between lines
of credit and cash is heavily inﬂuenced by that measure. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on Beta KMV
suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in asset beta (approximately one) decreases ﬁrm’s
reliance on credit lines by approximately 0.089 (more than 20% of the standard deviation of the
LC-to-Cash variable). This result is robust to the inclusion of industry dummies (column (3)), and
stock-return based variance measures (column (4)). Since the variance measures are computed in a
similar way to beta, in columns (5) and (6) we experiment with a speciﬁcation in which the variance
measure is also instrumented with its two ﬁrst lags. This change in speciﬁcation has no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the Beta KMV coeﬃcients.
− Table 3 about here −
It is important that we consider the validity of our instrumental variables approach to the mis-
measurement problem. The ﬁrst statistic we consider in this examination is the ﬁrst-stage exclusion
21F-tests for our set of instruments. Their associated p-values are all lower to 1% (conﬁrming the
explanatory power of our instruments). We also examine the validity of the exclusion restrictions
associated with our set of instruments. We do this using Hansen’s (1982) J-test statistic for overiden-
tifying restrictions. The p-values associated with Hansen’s test statistic are reported in the last row
of Table 3. The high p-values reported in the table imply the acceptance of the null hypothesis that
the identiﬁcation restrictions that justify the instruments chosen are met in the data. Speciﬁcally,
these reported statistics suggest that we do not reject the joint null hypothesis that our instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term in the leverage regression and the model is well-speciﬁed.
Table 4 uses Suﬁ’s (2009) measures of LC-to-Cash rather than LPC-Deal Scan data. In the
ﬁrst two columns, we replicate the results in Suﬁ’s Table 3, for both total and unused measures of
LC-to-Cash. Notice that the coeﬃcients are virtually identical to those in Suﬁ. We then introduce
our KMV-based proxy for aggregate risk exposure (Beta KMV). As in Table 3, the coeﬃcients
are statistically and economically signiﬁcant, both before and after controlling for asset variance
(Var KMV ). These results suggest that the relation between asset betas and liquidity management
that we uncover in this paper is economically signiﬁcant and robust to diﬀerent ways of computing
exposure to systematic risk and reliance on credit lines for liquidity management.
− Table 4 about here −
Tables 5 and 6 replace beta KMV with our alternative beta measures. Table 5 shows the results for
the LPC-Deal Scan sample,19 while Table 6 shows the results for Suﬁ’s (2009) sample. The results in
the ﬁrst column of Table 5 suggest that the results reported in Table 3 are robust to the method used
to unlever betas. Beta Asset (which is based directly on asset return data) has a similar relationship
to liquidity policy as that uncovered in Table 2. The economic magnitude of the coeﬃcient on Beta
Asset is in fact larger than that reported in Table 2. Using industry-level cash-adjusted betas, Beta
Cash, also produces similar results (column (2)). In column (3), we show that a ﬁrm’s exposure to
banking sector risks (Beta Bank)a ﬀects liquidity policy in a way that is consistent with the theory.
The coeﬃcients are also economically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, a one-standard deviation increase
in Beta Bank (which is equal to 0.7) decreases LC-to-Cash by 0.21, which is half of the standard
deviation of the LC-to-Cash variable. Column (4) shows that a ﬁrm’s exposure to tail risks is also
correlated with liquidity policy. Firms which tend to do poorly during market downturns have a
signiﬁcantly lower LC-to-Cash ratio. Column (5) replaces market-based beta measures with the
ﬁnancing gap beta (Beta Gap). Consistent with the theory, Beta Gap is signiﬁcantly related to the
LC-to-Cash ratio, though economic signiﬁcance is smaller than for the market measures (possibly
due to residual measurement error in these cash-ﬂow based betas).20 Finally, in column (6) we use
19To economize space we do not report the results using industry dummies in Table 5. All results continue to hold
if we do so.
20The coeﬃcient in column (5) suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in Beta Gap decreases LC-to-Cash
22value-weighted industry betas rather than ﬁrm-level betas in the regression. Using industry betas is
an alternative way to address the possibility that ﬁrm-level betas are measured with error. Thus, in
column (6) we do not instrument betas with the ﬁrst two lags (as we do in the other columns). The
results again suggest a signiﬁcant relationship between asset beta and the LC-to-Cash ratio.
− Table 5 about here −
Table 6 replicates the analysis in Table 5 for Suﬁ’s (2009) sample. The results show that the
relationship between beta and liquidity management also holds when using that sample, for both
measures of liquidity management (using total and unused credit lines). The only diﬀerence between
t h er e s u l t si nT a b l e5a n dT a b l e6i st h a ti ns o m ec a s e st h es t a t i s t i c a ls i g n i ﬁcance of the beta coef-
ﬁcients is lower in Table 6 (such as for Beta Bank and Beta Gap). This diﬀerence is probably due
to the decrease in the number of observations in Table 6, relative to Table 5.
− Table 6 about here −
3.3.4 SUR models for cash and credit lines
As discussed by Suﬁ (2009), the variable LC-to-Cash has the advantage of isolating the relative
importance of credit lines versus cash for corporate liquidity management, while controlling for the
ﬁrm’s total liquidity demand. Our theory also makes predictions about the relative usage of cash
versus credit lines. Accordingly, our tests focus on LC-to-Cash.
Naturally, it is interesting to examine how asset betas impact the ﬁrm’s choice of cash and credit
lines separately. In order to do this, we use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, in which
we regress measures of line of credit usage and cash holdings (both scaled by assets net of cash)
on betas and the control variables listed in equation (28). To address measurement error, these
regressions use predicted values of beta on the right-hand side, using a model that includes two lags
of beta and the other control variables. The results are presented in Table 7.
− Table 7 about here −
When using the LPC-Deal Scan data, we ﬁnd that asset betas impact mostly the ﬁrm’s cash hold-
ings, while they are insigniﬁcantly related to the ﬁrm’s demand for credit lines. However, using Suﬁ’s
data (in particular the measure that includes all credit lines, both used and unused) we ﬁnd evidence
that asset betas both increase cash and also reduce the demand for credit lines (see columns (5) and
(6)). One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is the better coverage of line of credit data in Suﬁ’s
sample. These results are interesting in their own right and more fully characterize our main insights.
by approximately 1.5%.
233.3.5 Sorting ﬁrms according to proxies for ﬁnancing constraints
As the model in Section 2 makes it clear, the choice between cash and credit lines should be most
relevant for ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially constrained. This line of argument suggests that the relation-
ship that we ﬁnd above should be driven by ﬁrms that ﬁnd it more costly to raise external funds.
In this section we employ speciﬁcations in which we sort ﬁrms into “ﬁnancially constrained” and
“ﬁnancially unconstrained” categories. We do not have strong priors about which approach is best
and follow prior studies in using multiple alternative schemes to partition our sample:
• Scheme #1: We rank ﬁrms based on their payout ratio and assign to the ﬁnancially constrained
(unconstrained) group those ﬁrms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout distri-
bution. The intuition that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower payout ratios
follows from Fazzari et al. (1988), among many others, in the ﬁnancial constraints literature.
In the capital structure literature, Fama and French (2002) use payout ratios as a measure of
diﬃculties ﬁrms may face in assessing the ﬁnancial markets.
• Scheme #2: We rank ﬁrms based on their asset size, and assign to the ﬁnancially constrained
(unconstrained) group those ﬁrms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the size distribution.
This approach resembles that of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), who also distinguish be-
tween groups of ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms on the basis of size. Fama and
French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) also associate ﬁrm size with the degree of external
ﬁnancing frictions. The argument for size as a good observable measure of ﬁnancial constraints
is that small ﬁrms are typically young, less well known, and thus more vulnerable to credit
imperfections.
• Scheme #3: We rank ﬁrms based on whether they have bond and commercial paper ratings.
A ﬁrm is deemed to be constrained if it has neither a bond nor a commercial paper rating. it
is unconstrained if it has both a bond and a commercial paper rating.
We repeat the regressions performed in Table 2, but now separately for ﬁnancially constrained
and unconstrained subsamples. Table 6 presents the results we obtain. The table shows that the
relationship between beta and the usage of credit lines holds only in the constrained samples, for all
criteria.21 These results are once again consistent with the model in Section 2.
− Table 8 about here −
21While the beta coeﬃcient for the non-rated sample is only marginally signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.107), its magnitude
is signiﬁcantly more negative than that of the sub-sample of ﬁrms that have both bond and commercial paper ratings.
243.3.6 Year-by-year regressions and macroeconomic eﬀects
Next, we provide evidence on the time variation of the relationship between systematic risk (Beta
KMV) and credit line usage (LC-to-Cash). To do this, we run the regression in equation (28) every
year between 1988 and 2008, collect the coeﬃcients β1 for each time period, and examine their re-
lationship to a proxy for overall risk in the economy, VIX(the implied volatility on S&P 500 index
options).22 A simple regression of β1,t on VIX t produces a negative coeﬃcient of −0.094,w i t ha
t-statistic of 1.87. This suggests that when VIXgoes up, the eﬀect of beta on the LC-to-Cash ratio
(captured by β1,t) becomes more pronounced.
In addition to this simple regression, we also experiment with alternative speciﬁcations in which
we include additional macroeconomic variables. For example, previous banking literature suggests
that during crises, banks experience an inﬂow of deposits coming from the commercial paper market.
This eﬀect, in turn, helps them to honor their loan commitments (e.g., Gatev and Strahan (2005)).
Banks’ increased ability to honor their loan commitments during bad times may then counteract
the eﬀect of VIXon corporate liquidity management. As shown by Gatev and Strahan, this inﬂow
eﬀect tends to happen in times when the spread of commercial paper over treasury rates is high.
Accordingly, we include the CP—treasury spread in the regression that explains the time variation in
β1,t.23 We also include a time trend, and real GDP growth to capture general economic conditions.
We obtain the following result, which we report in the text. The t-statistics associated with each













This regression shows that the Beta KMV coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly more negative in periods
when VIX is high, controlling for variation in other economic variables. That is, riskier ﬁrms resort
more to cash (as opposed to lines of credit) in periods of elevated aggregate risk. The positive
coeﬃcient on the CP—Treasury Spread indicates that the ﬂight to bank deposits in bad times does
mitigate some of the eﬀect of VIX on liquidity management (consistent with arguments in the existing
literature).
3.3.7 Asset beta and loan spreads
The empirical facts uncovered so far all suggest that ﬁrms with high aggregate risk exposure hold
more cash relative to lines of credit. This eﬀect arises in our theoretical model since ﬁrms with
greater aggregate risk exposure face a higher cost of bank lines of credit. To investigate this channel,
we perform a ﬁnal important test. Speciﬁcally, we provide evidence on the relationship between
22We divide VIX by 100 to increase the magnitude of the coeﬃcients.
23The CP-treasury spread is measured using 3-month CP and treasury rates (data from the FRB).
25systematic risk (BetaKMV) and the spreads paid by ﬁrms on their credit lines. To do this, we
regress the average annual spreads paid by ﬁrm i in deals initiated in year t,24 on Beta KMV and
controls. We control for other deal terms including the size of credit line facilities raised in year t
scaled by assets (
LCi,t
Assetsi,t), and the average maturity of the credit lines raised in year t (Maturityi,t).
We also control for the level of the LIBOR in the quarter when the credit line was raised.25 Our







Ye a r t+²i,t,
(30)
where X is the vector of ﬁrm characteristics used in equation (28). As in previous estimations,
BetaKMV i,t is instrumented with its ﬁrst two lags to address measurement error in beta.
The results are presented in Table 9. We ﬁrst run a regression with no controls other than year
dummies (column (1)), using All-in drawn spreadi,t as the dependent variable. The coeﬃcient on
BetaKMV is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that high asset beta ﬁrms pay higher spreads on
their credit lines. The coeﬃcient estimate of 0.24 indicates that an increase in asset beta from 0.75
to 1.5 is associated with an increase of 18 basis points on credit line spreads (approximately 20% of
the standard deviation in All-in drawn spread). Columns (2) and (3) suggest that this association
is robust to the introduction of other deal terms and ﬁrm characteristics in the regression (though
economic signiﬁcance is lower after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics). Columns (4) through (6)
show similar results for the alternative spread measure (Undrawn spread). The evidence suggests
that an increase in Beta from 0.75 to 1.5 increases undrawn spreads by 3 to 4 basis points, 20% of
the standard deviation reported in Table 1.
− Table 9 about here −
As discussed above, these results must be interpreted with caution given the diﬃculty of simulta-
neously addressing the endogeneity of the diﬀerent contractual terms. Nevertheless, Table 9 provides
suggestive evidence that ﬁrms with high exposure to systematic risk face worse contractual terms
when initiating credit lines.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We show that aggregate risk aﬀects ﬁrms’ choice between cash and credit lines. For ﬁrms with high
exposure to systematic risk, the folk statement that “cash is king” appears to be true. In contrast,
24This annual average is weighted by the amount raised in each credit line deal.
25To be clear, the data on LIBOR refers to the level of LIBOR in the quarter in which ﬁrm i initiates the credit
line. We annualize this variable by computing the facility size-weighted, ﬁrm-year average (LIBORi,t). Notice that
since ﬁrms initiate credit lines in diﬀerent quarters, this variable varies both over time and across ﬁrms.
26for ﬁrms that only need to manage their idiosyncratic liquidity risk, bank credit lines dominate cash
holdings. In our empirical tests we measure a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk using asset betas.
Our results show a negative, statistically signiﬁcant and economically large eﬀect of asset betas on
the fraction of total liquidity that is held via credit lines. This eﬀect increases during times when
systematic risk is high, and is stronger among groups of ﬁrms that are more likely to be ﬁnancially
constrained (such as small ﬁrms). These results shed light on an important trade-oﬀ between cash
and credit lines for corporate liquidity management, and they suggest a new role for aggregate risk
(beta) in corporate ﬁnance.
There are many ways in which our paper can be extended. One of the most interesting ex-
tensions has to do with the role of bank capital for corporate liquidity management. The current
framework has no role for bank capital, given that cash can be eﬃciently held inside the corporate
sector. However, in a more general framework this conclusion may not hold. In order for banks
to be able to build an “excess” liquidity buﬀer and help in aggregate crises, they must be special
and earn some rents (such as information rents). Such an argument suggests that securitization
may limit the ability of banks to intermediate in aggregate crises. Bank rents can also come from
market concentration. This argument suggests that concentrated and scope-restricted banks may be
able to intermediate better in aggregate crises. In either case, a ﬁrm’s decision to manage liquidity
needs through cash holdings or lines of credit should be aﬀected by unexpected shocks to capital
of its relationship bank(s), especially during crises (when other better-capitalized banks also ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to oﬀer further lines of credit given heightened aggregate risk levels). Finally, in such a
framework of bank capital, government bailouts and/or guarantees during aggregate crises can lead
to ex-ante under-investment in bank capital, generate moral hazard in the form of banks issuing lines
of credit to risky ﬁrms, and potentially lead to excessive aggregate risk in the economy. In all, these
arguments highlight that it is important for researchers and policy-makers to better understand
these dynamics of liquidity management in the economy.
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29Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
First, notice that if constraint (13) is satisﬁed for xθ =1and Lθ =0 , then systematic ﬁrms will
not ﬁnd it optimal to hold cash (since the solution to (14) would then be equivalent to that of
non-systematic ﬁrms). This situation arises when:
ρ − ρ0 ≤ wmax.( 3 1 )
In such case, both systematic and non-systematic ﬁrms can use credit lines to manage liquidity.
Notice that this corresponds to scenarios in which θ ≤ θmax in Proposition 1.
If in turn ρ−ρ0 >w max, systematic ﬁrms will generally demand cash in addition to credit lines.
For each xθ, their cash demand is given by equation (20).
Next, we consider the ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy xθ as a function of the liquidity premium
q, xθ(q).T h e ﬁr m ’ sl i q u i d i t yd e m a n dc a nt h e nb ed e r i v e df r o me q u a t i o n( 2 0 ) . T oﬁnd the ﬁrm’s




.( 3 2 )
In the range of prices such that q<q 2,t h eﬁrm’s optimal choice would be xθ =1 .I f q>q 2,t h e
ﬁrm’s optimal choice is xθ =0 .T h e ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between all xθ ∈ [0,1] when q = q2.I n
addition to these payoﬀ considerations, the budget constraint in problem (14) can also bind for a
positive level of xθ. The budget constraint can be written as:
I +( q − 1)
h
xθ(ρ − ρ0) − wmax
i
+ λxθρ ≤ (1 − λ)ρ0 + λxθρ0,o r ( 3 3 )
xθ ≤
(1 − λ)ρ0 − I +( q − 1)wmax
(λ + q − 1)(ρ − ρ0)
.( 3 4 )
The right-hand side of equation (34) is greater than one since (1−λ)ρ0 −I −λ(ρ−ρ0) > 0 (by (4)).
Thus, there exists a maximum level of q such that the budget constraint is obeyed for xθ =1 .C a l l
this level q1. We can solve for q1 as:
q1 =1+
ρ0 − λρ − I
ρ − ρ0 − wmax.( 3 5 )
Clearly, for q<min(q1,q 2) we will have xθ(q)=1 .A s q increases, either the ﬁrm’s budget
constraint binds, or its payoﬀ becomes decreasing in cash holdings. The ﬁrm’s speciﬁc level of x(q)
will then depend on whether q1 is larger than q2.
Appendix B Characterization of the equilibrium when Ls <L s
1(θ)
Suppose ﬁrst that q1 >q 2, such that the ﬁrm’s budget constraint never binds in equilibrium. In this
case, if Ls <L s
1 we will have that q∗ = q2 > 1. To see why, notice that if q<q 2 then systematic ﬁrms
would choose xθ =1 , which is not compatible with equilibrium. If q>q 2,t h e nxθ =1 , generating
an excess supply of cash. Thus, we must have q∗ = q2. Since systematic ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
any xθ between 0 and 1 when q = q2, we can sustain an equilibrium such that:
θ[xθ(q2)(ρ − ρ0) − wmax]=Ls.( 3 6 )
30This is the unique equilibrium of the model. To see why, notice that for xθ >x θ(q2),c a s h
demand would be larger than supply, and if xθ <x θ(q2), cash supply would be greater than demand
and thus the cost of cash would drop to q =1 .
If q1 <q 2, then the ﬁrm’s budget constraint will bind in equilibrium, and we will have q1 <q ∗ ≤
q2.T h ec o s to fc a s hq∗ is such that the demand for cash exactly equals supply:
θ[xθ(q∗)(ρ − ρ0) − wmax]=Ls.( 3 7 )
Since q1 <q ∗,t h e nxθ(q∗) < 1.S i n c e q∗ ≤ q2, then systematic ﬁrms would like to increase their
demand for cash beyond xθ(q∗), but they cannot aﬀo r dt od os o .T h u s ,q∗ is the equilibrium cost of
cash in this case.
Finally, notice that since the cost of cash cannot be greater than q2, there is a level of liquidity
supply (denoted by Ls
min) such that for all Ls <L s
min, the equilibrium is q∗ = q2. Ls
min is such that
the maximum level of xθ that satisﬁes the budget constraint when q = q2 yields a demand for cash
exactly equal to Ls
min:
θ[xθ(q2)(ρ − ρ0) − wmax]=Ls
min.( 3 8 )
31Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports basic summary statistics for empirical proxies related to ﬁrm characteristics. LC-to-Cash is
the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by lines of credit, speciﬁcally the ratio of the ﬁrm’s total
amount of open credit lines to the sum of open credit lines plus cash balances. Assets are ﬁrm assets net of cash,
measured in millions of dollars. Tangibility is PPE over assets. Q is deﬁned as a cash-adjusted, market-to-book
assets ratio. NetWorth is the book value of equity minus cash over total assets. Proﬁtability is the ratio of
EBITDA over net assets. Industry sales volatility (IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of the
within-year standard deviation of quarterly changes in ﬁrm sales, scaled by the average quarterly gross asset
value in the year. Proﬁtability is the ﬁrm-level standard deviation of annual changes in the level of EBITDA,
calculated using four lags, and scaled by average gross assets in the lagged period. Firm Age is measured
as the diﬀerence between the current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared in COMPUSTAT.
Unused LC-to-Cash and Total LC-to-Cash measure the fraction of total corporate liquidity that is provided
by credit lines using unused and total credit lines respectively. BetaKMV is the ﬁrm’s asset (unlevered) beta,
calculated from equity (levered) betas and a Merton-KMV formula. betaAsset is another proxy for the ﬁrm’s
asset (unlevered) beta, calculated directly from data on asset returns as in Choi (2009). VarKMV and varAsset
are the corresponding values for total asset variance. BetaCash is the (3-digit SIC industry median) asset Beta,
adjusted for cash holdings. BetaBank is the ﬁrm’s beta with respect to an index of bank stock returns. BetaTail
is a measure of beta that is based on the average stock return of a ﬁrm in the days in which the stock market
had its worst 5% returns in the year. BetaGap is computed using the diﬀerence between investment and cash
ﬂows at the 3-digit SIC level, and the aggregate ﬁnancing gap. All-in drawn spread is the average for all deals
observed for a single ﬁrm in a given year. The average is computed using the size of the loan facility as weights,
and is measured in basis points. Undrawn spread is computed similarly, but it includes only the spread on the
undrawn portion of the credit line.Panel A: LPC credit line data
Variables Mean StDev Median 25% 75% Firm-years
LC-to-Cash 0.325 0.404 0.000 0.000 0.781 44598
CashHold_A 0.148 0.216 0.053 0.016 0.173 44817
Total LC 0.146 1.316 0.000 0.000 0.173 44817
Tangibility 0.350 0.232 0.297 0.164 0.498 43250
Assets 2594.093 17246.889 270.431 68.545 1094.000 43309
Q 1.961 1.314 1.475 1.114 2.227 43288
Networth 0.381 0.248 0.404 0.254 0.558 43288
Proﬁtability 0.137 0.120 0.141 0.085 0.203 43309
IndSalesVol 0.043 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.050 44823
ProﬁtVol 0.063 0.053 0.044 0.024 0.083 44821
Firm age 18.855 14.339 14.000 7.000 29.000 44825
betaKMV 0.986 1.032 0.856 0.290 1.545 44402
betaCash 0.970 0.574 0.920 0.602 1.292 44714
betaBank 0.445 0.703 0.390 0.013 0.813 44440
betaTail 0.742 0.567 0.697 0.324 1.099 44367
betaGap 0.928 3.018 1.156 -1.268 4.000 44825
All-in drawn spread 177.134 112.356 175.000 75.000 255.000 11408
Undrawn spread 31.520 16.727 30.000 16.250 50.000 9865
varKMV 0.017 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.020 44825
betaAsset 0.919 0.926 0.756 0.303 1.343 14646
varAsset 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.003 0.013 14646
Panel B: Suﬁ data
Variables Mean StDev Median 25% 75% Firm-years
Unused LC-to-Cash 0.450 0.373 0.455 0.000 0.822 1906
Total LC-to-Cash 0.512 0.388 0.569 0.000 0.900 1908
Tangibility 0.332 0.230 0.275 0.146 0.481 1908
Assets 1441.409 7682.261 116.411 23.981 522.201 1908
Q 2.787 3.185 1.524 1.069 2.726 1905
Networth 0.426 0.300 0.453 0.284 0.633 1905
Proﬁtability 0.015 0.413 0.126 0.040 0.198 1908
IndSalesVol 0.043 0.026 0.036 0.024 0.051 1908
ProﬁtVol 0.089 0.078 0.061 0.028 0.126 1908
Firm age 16.037 13.399 10.000 6.000 23.000 1908
betaKMV 1.002 1.068 0.804 0.286 1.609 1559
varKMV 0.026 0.026 0.015 0.007 0.038 1568Table 2: Correlations among diﬀerent proxies for asset beta.
See Table 1 for a description of the variables.
betaKMV betaCash betaBank betaTail betaGap betaAsset varAsset
betaCash 0.4255
betaBank 0.6598 0.3129
betaTail 0.4421 0.3734 0.2484
betaGap 0.1022 0.3016 0.0828 0.1432
betaAsset 0.9000 0.4596 0.6718 0.5204 0.2072
varAsset 0.5002 0.4712 0.2253 0.3594 0.2593 0.5554
varKMV 0.5541 0.4094 0.2710 0.2877 0.1233 0.5306 0.9597Table 3: The Choice Between Cash and Credit Lines - KMV Betas
This Table reports regressions of a measure of line of credit usage in corporate liquidity policy on asset (un-
levered) beta and controls. The dependent variable is LC-to-Cash, deﬁned in Table 1. betaKMV is the ﬁrm’s
asset (unlevered) beta, calculated from equity (levered) betas and a Merton-KMV formula. varKMV is the
corresponding value for total asset variance. BetaKMV is instrumented with its ﬁrst two lags in all regressions.
In columns (5) and (6) we also instrument varKMV with its ﬁrst two lags. All other variables are described in
Table 1.
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
betaKMV -0.089*** -0.083*** -0.113*** -0.067** -0.059*
(-5.626) (-4.947) (-4.749) (-2.181) (-1.778)
varKMV 1.721*** -1.506 -1.681
(2.906) (-1.133) (-1.209)
Proﬁtability 0.136*** 0.089*** 0.101*** 0.128*** 0.055 0.063
(5.435) (2.962) (3.274) (4.194) (1.430) (1.633)
Tangibility 0.012 0.030 0.004 0.030 0.031 0.004
(0.606) (1.437) (0.173) (1.393) (1.467) (0.168)
Size 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.047***
(16.15) (16.87) (16.15) (14.70) (9.612) (8.726)
Networth -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.132*** -0.120*** -0.127*** -0.136***
(-9.817) (-7.500) (-8.008) (-7.080) (-7.389) (-7.883)
Q -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(-23.84) (-14.88) (-14.21) (-15.56) (-15.65) (-14.94)
IndSalesVol -0.197 -0.031 -0.219 -0.047 -0.018 -0.208
(-1.343) (-0.227) (-1.349) (-0.336) (-0.130) (-1.279)
ProﬁtVol -0.250*** 0.051 0.033 -0.037 0.129 0.121
(-3.751) (0.581) (0.380) (-0.467) (1.408) (1.316)
Ln Firm age -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.053***
(-7.933) (-6.787) (-6.819) (-6.579) (-6.989) (-7.049)
Constant 0.379*** 0.552*** 0.465*** 0.508*** 0.591*** 0.511***
(5.710) (17.05) (6.044) (15.86) (13.20) (6.064)
Industry Fixed-eﬀect Yes No Yes No No Yes
Year Fixed-eﬀect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.312 0.385 0.396 0.011 0.013
Observations 43009 35372 35372 35372 35372 35372
R2 0.173 0.165 0.168 0.166 0.166 0.169
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 4: Using Suﬁ’s (2009) line of credit data
This Table reports regressions of a measure of line of credit usage in corporate liquidity policy on asset (unlevered)
beta and controls. The dependent variables are Unused LC-to-Cash and Total LC-to-Cash, deﬁned in Table
1. betaKMV is the ﬁrm’s asset (unlevered) beta, calculated from equity (levered) betas and a Merton-KMV
formula. varKMV is the corresponding value for total asset variance. All Beta measures are instrumented with
their ﬁrst two lags. In columns (4) and (6) the variance measures are also instrumented with their ﬁrst two
lags. All other variables are described in Table 1.
Dependent variable:
Total Unused Total Total Unused Unused
LC-to-Cash LC-to-Cash LC-to-Cash LC-to-Cash LC-to-Cash LC-to-Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
betaKMV -0.336*** -0.419*** -0.270*** -0.322**
(-5.489) (-2.801) (-4.893) (-2.438)
varKMV 3.114 1.649
(0.654) (0.387)
Proﬁtability 0.078** 0.061* -0.013 0.003 -0.012 -0.004
(2.269) (1.955) (-0.226) (0.0518) (-0.238) (-0.0736)
Tangibility 0.040 0.025 -0.089 -0.081 -0.091 -0.088
(0.560) (0.371) (-1.098) (-0.938) (-1.184) (-1.092)
Size 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.081***
(5.110) (6.106) (5.593) (3.621) (6.481) (3.992)
Networth -0.097** -0.054 -0.077 -0.072 -0.043 -0.040
(-2.293) (-1.396) (-1.345) (-1.141) (-0.819) (-0.708)
Q -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.016 -0.016** -0.013
(-8.495) (-7.263) (-2.656) (-1.516) (-2.398) (-1.479)
IndSalesVol 1.094* 1.042 -0.156 -0.138 -0.073 -0.075
(1.691) (1.549) (-0.215) (-0.186) (-0.0927) (-0.0951)
ProﬁtVol -0.596*** -0.554*** 0.315 0.272 0.198 0.192
(-3.209) (-3.162) (1.022) (0.887) (0.711) (0.716)
Ln Firm age -0.039* -0.023 -0.086*** -0.083*** -0.061** -0.061**
(-1.846) (-1.125) (-2.818) (-2.731) (-2.101) (-2.102)
Constant 0.748*** 0.148 0.306** 0.250 0.165 0.141
(8.612) (1.377) (2.359) (1.516) (1.332) (0.945)
Industry Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-eﬀect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.016
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.283 0.569 0.174 0.295
Observations 1905 1903 1321 1321 1319 1319
R2 0.401 0.371 0.437 0.444 0.399 0.406
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 5: The Choice Between Cash and Credit Lines - Varying Betas
This Table reports regressions of a measure of line of credit usage in corporate liquidity policy on asset (unlevered)
beta and controls. All variables are described in Table 1. In columns (1) to (5), Beta measures are instrumented
with their ﬁrst two lags. In column (6), we use an industry beta rather than the ﬁrm-level instrumented beta
in the regression.
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash













Proﬁtability 0.055 0.116*** 0.070** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.124***
(0.860) (5.088) (2.141) (4.041) (4.779) (5.008)
Tangibility 0.015 -0.004 -0.001 0.028 0.025 0.048**
(0.364) (-0.239) (-0.0483) (1.331) (1.320) (2.400)
Size 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.049*** 0.042***
(7.126) (19.96) (16.40) (17.53) (17.87) (14.52)
Networth -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.114*** -0.110*** -0.124*** -0.114***
(-3.346) (-8.612) (-6.534) (-6.685) (-9.080) (-8.204)
Q -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.056*** -0.052***
(-8.631) (-23.03) (-12.99) (-12.50) (-25.42) (-22.09)
IndSalesVol -0.079 -0.128 0.012 0.020 -0.187 0.132
(-0.304) (-1.066) (0.0895) (0.144) (-1.356) (0.826)
ProﬁtVol -0.156 -0.013 0.114 0.083 -0.254*** -0.198***
(-0.855) (-0.199) (1.152) (1.012) (-3.608) (-2.785)
Ln Firm age -0.027** -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.042*** -0.046***
(-1.995) (-8.494) (-6.842) (-7.038) (-6.678) (-6.902)
Constant 0.581*** 0.614*** 0.543*** 0.503*** 0.453*** 0.362***
(9.837) (21.43) (16.69) (16.49) (16.66) (13.52)
Industry Fixed-eﬀect No No No No No No
Year Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.101 0.005 0.555 0.000 0.873
Observations 9536 46865 35499 35343 37485 31811
R
2 0.198 0.162 0.163 0.167 0.155 0.164
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 6: The Choice Between Cash and Credit Lines - Varying Betas,
Suﬁ (2009) sample
This Table reports regressions of measures of line of credit usage in corporate liquidity policy on asset (unlevered)
beta and controls. All variables are described in Table 1. In both panels, in columns (1) to (5) Beta measures
are instrumented with their ﬁrst two lags. In column (6), we use an industry beta rather than the ﬁrm-level
instrumented beta in the regression.
Panel A
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash













Proﬁtability -0.134** 0.100*** 0.048 0.229** 0.061* 0.108***
(-2.094) (2.762) (0.845) (2.489) (1.760) (2.843)
Tangibility -0.079 -0.030 -0.026 0.037 0.088 0.098
(-0.651) (-0.433) (-0.273) (0.343) (1.183) (1.117)
Size 0.109*** 0.048*** 0.077*** 0.032* 0.047*** 0.037***
(7.573) (5.025) (4.474) (1.882) (4.852) (3.242)
Networth -0.090 -0.057 -0.127* -0.159 -0.076* -0.103**
(-1.157) (-1.356) (-1.912) (-1.430) (-1.814) (-2.378)
Q -0.015* -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.035***
(-1.957) (-7.147) (-3.938) (-2.731) (-8.880) (-8.413)
IndSalesVol 1.299 0.452 0.370 0.245 1.471** 1.790**
(1.375) (0.845) (0.467) (0.318) (2.541) (2.373)
proﬁtVol 1.033* -0.252 0.236 -0.241 -0.655*** -0.381*
(1.922) (-1.224) (0.604) (-0.821) (-3.131) (-1.734)
Ln Firm Age -0.040 -0.041** -0.080** -0.077** -0.032 -0.030
(-1.006) (-1.961) (-2.344) (-2.363) (-1.450) (-1.156)
Constant 0.680*** 0.367* 0.371*** 0.565***
(6.857) (1.955) (4.093) (5.174)
Industry Fixed-eﬀect Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.063 0.041 0.043 0.086 0.023
Observations 434 1866 1322 866 1659 1241
R
2 0.651 0.427 0.416 0.366 0.401 0.383
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Panel B
Dependent variable: Unused LC-to-Cash













Proﬁtability -0.127** 0.084** 0.036 0.247** 0.049 0.081**
(-2.175) (2.500) (0.636) (2.384) (1.516) (2.358)
Tangibility -0.220* -0.027 -0.057 0.058 0.054 0.040
(-1.889) (-0.367) (-0.584) (0.411) (0.687) (0.483)
Size 0.100*** 0.045*** 0.068*** 0.016 0.049*** 0.041***
(6.858) (4.669) (4.026) (0.857) (5.103) (4.007)
Networth -0.094 -0.044 -0.132** -0.181* -0.052 -0.083**
(-1.203) (-1.152) (-2.159) (-1.740) (-1.341) (-2.130)
Q -0.012 -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.028** -0.029*** -0.029***
(-1.591) (-6.459) (-3.772) (-2.244) (-7.449) (-7.450)
IndSalesVol 3.049** 0.820 0.438 0.054 1.420** 1.652**
(2.209) (1.183) (0.385) (0.0415) (2.170) (2.160)
proﬁtVol 0.787 -0.259 0.200 -0.389 -0.518** -0.373*
(1.502) (-1.269) (0.562) (-1.253) (-2.541) (-1.769)
Ln Firm Age -0.053 -0.017 -0.063 -0.048 -0.012 -0.008
(-1.306) (-0.727) (-1.487) (-1.074) (-0.491) (-0.320)
Constant 0.458*** 0.304 0.232*** 0.402***
(4.695) (1.373) (2.632) (3.977)
Industry Fixed-eﬀect Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.081 0.337 0.080 0.155 0.262
Observations 348 1437 963 574 1396 1241
R
2 0.632 0.388 0.388 0.310 0.373 0.352
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 7: SUR models for cash and credit lines
This Table reports seemingly unrelated regressions of line of credit usage and cash holdings on asset (unlevered)
beta and controls. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) are Total LC (total lines of credit divided by
assets net of cash), and cash (cash holdings divided by assets net of cash). In columns (1) and (2) we measure
Total LC using the LPC-Deal Scan sample (described in Panel A of Table 1), and in columns (3) and (4) we
use Suﬁ (2009) data, described in Panel B of Table 1. The dependent variables in columns (5) to (6) are
Unused LC (total lines of credit divided by assets net of cash), and cash (cash holdings divided by assets net of
cash). betaKMV is the ﬁrm’s asset (unlevered) beta, calculated from equity (levered) betas and a Merton-KMV
formula. varKMV is the corresponding value for total asset variance. All Beta measures are instrumented with
their ﬁrst two lags. All other variables are described in Table 1.Dependent variables:
Total LC Total LC-to-Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4)
betaKMV 0.020 0.030 -0.338*** -0.302***
(0.55) (0.72) (8.70) (7.51)
varKMV -0.84 -1.687***
(-1.63) (-4.12)
Proﬁtability -0.148* -0.177** -0.010 -0.030
(-1.84) (-2.13) (-0.42) (-1.03)
Tangibility -0.060 -0.060 -0.097** -0.107**
(-1.53) (-1.590) (-2.240) (-2.46)
Size -0.014** -0.016** 0.073*** 0.067***
(-2.31) (-2.51) (12.29) (11.00)
Networth -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.084*** -0.084***
(-4.71) (-4.56) (-2.82) (-2.80)
Q -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.022***
(-3.53) (-3.33) (-4.94) (-5.39)
IndSalesVol 0.140 0.150 -0.220 -0.220
(0.46) (0.48) (-0.58) (-0.57)
ProﬁtVol -0.180 -0.12 0 0.317* 0.384**
(-0.89) (-0.54) (1.90) (2.26)
Ln Firm age -0.01 -0.01 -0.086*** -0.088***
(-0.66) (-0.69) (-5.85) (-6.00)
Constant 0.512*** 0.384*** 0.422***
(3.59) (3.30) (3.65)
Observations 36315 35524 1348 1321
R2 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.45
Dependent variable: CashHold_A
betaKMV 0.128*** 0.118*** 0.350*** 0.341***
(25.26) (22.89) (6.971) (6.572)
varKMV 0.821*** 0.28
(13.48) (0.520)
Proﬁtability -0.035*** -0.018* -0.190*** -0.142***
(-3.626) (-1.842) (-5.133) (-3.684)
Tangibility -0.013*** -0.013*** 0 0.03
(-2.907) (-2.714) (0.00936) (0.448)
Size -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.105*** -0.106***
(-36.86) (-33.47) (-13.66) (-13.46)
Networth -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.291*** -0.319***
(-11.73) (-12.82) (-7.548) (-8.191)
Q 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.048***
(50.22) (50.10) (8.911) (9.110)
IndSalesVol 0.03 0.02 0.76 0.52
(0.704) (0.536) (1.522) (1.030)
ProﬁtVol 0.086*** 0.052** -0.960*** -0.943***
(3.468) (2.065) (-4.464) (-4.304)
Ln Firm age 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.085*** 0.084***
(2.935) (3.847) (4.449) (4.436)
Constant 0.150*** 0.244*
(9.507) (1.934)
Observations 36315 35524 1348 1321
R2 0.33 0.34 0.53 0.53
Robust z-statistics in parentheses .* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 8: Sorting on Proxies for Financing Constraints
This Table reports regressions of a measure of line of credit usage in corporate liquidity policy on asset (un-
levered) beta and controls. The dependent variable is LC-to-Cash, deﬁned in Table 1. betaKMV is the ﬁrm’s
asset (unlevered) beta, calculated from equity (levered) betas and a Merton-KMV formula. varKMV is the
corresponding value for total asset variance. All beta and variance measures are instrumented with their ﬁrst
two lags. In column (1) we use a sample of small ﬁrms (those with assets in the 30th percentile and lower). In
column (2) we use a sample of large ﬁrms (those with assets in the 70th percentile and higher). In column (3)
we use a sample of ﬁrms with low payouts (those with payout in the 30th percentile and lower). In column (4)
we use a sample of ﬁrms with high payouts (those with payout in the 70th percentile and higher). In column
(5) we use a sample of ﬁrms that have neither a bond, nor a commercial paper rating. In column (6) we use a
sample of ﬁrms that have both bond and commercial paper ratings. All other variables are described in Table
1.
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Large Low payout High payout Non-rated Rated
ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
betaKMV -0.227** -0.020 -0.184*** 0.006 -0.070 0.073
(-2.206) (-0.392) (-3.655) (0.115) (-1.613) (0.639)
varKMV 6.282 -6.350** 2.404 -4.494** -0.701 -13.558
(1.587) (-2.267) (1.178) (-2.100) (-0.389) (-1.596)
Proﬁtability 0.128* 0.174* 0.208*** -0.048 0.023 0.191
(1.723) (1.749) (3.765) (-0.786) (0.528) (0.742)
Tangibility -0.009 0.022 0.009 0.051* 0.036 0.030
(-0.286) (0.582) (0.360) (1.650) (1.519) (0.403)
Size 0.107*** 0.004 0.073*** 0.038*** 0.056*** 0.005
(4.917) (0.444) (8.187) (5.632) (6.611) (0.281)
Networth -0.054* -0.174*** -0.082*** -0.157*** -0.116*** -0.235***
(-1.810) (-4.512) (-3.535) (-5.895) (-5.991) (-3.064)
Q -0.006 -0.065*** -0.027*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.054***
(-0.523) (-9.407) (-4.709) (-10.64) (-11.37) (-3.151)
IndSalesVol 0.256 -0.028 0.085 -0.153 0.093 0.145
(1.044) (-0.116) (0.449) (-0.788) (0.600) (0.325)
ProﬁtVol -0.182 0.416** -0.052 0.176 0.152 0.386
(-0.954) (1.976) (-0.440) (1.186) (1.512) (0.640)
Ln Firm age -0.005 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.048*
(-0.329) (-2.978) (-3.837) (-4.433) (-5.975) (-1.811)
Constant -0.035 0.939*** 0.374*** 0.644*** 0.507*** 0.918***
(-0.223) (10.23) (5.080) (10.75) (7.605) (4.359)
Year Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.904 0.001 0.248 0.011 0.346 0.223
Observations 8436 12578 14908 14162 22548 4344
R2 0.102 0.143 0.178 0.164 0.135 0.142
Robust z-statistics in parentheses .* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Table 9: KMV Betas and Credit Line Spreads
This Table reports regressions of line of credit spreads on asset (unlevered) beta and controls. Maturity is the
average maturity of deals initiated in a given year, for each ﬁrm. LIBOR is the level of the LIBOR (in basis
points) in the quarter in which a deal was initiated, for each ﬁrm. New LC is the total size of deals initiated in
a ﬁrm-year, scaled by assets. All other variables are described in Table 1. KMV Beta is instrumented with its
ﬁrst two lags.
Dependent variables:
All-in drawn spread Undrawn spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
betaKMV 24.415*** 23.299*** 13.894** 4.342*** 4.160*** 4.810***
(3.138) (2.989) (2.227) (3.179) (3.161) (3.847)
Maturity -0.933*** 0.391* 0.637*** 0.674***
(-2.586) (1.750) (11.38) (16.17)
LIBOR -0.038 -0.006 -0.003 0.000
(-1.182) (-0.278) (-0.671) (0.0358)
New LC 13.907 -22.835*** 1.219 -2.638***















Constant 149.371*** 171.216*** 504.532*** 24.713*** 19.293*** 62.630***
(13.13) (10.27) (39.00) (12.63) (7.396) (26.10)
Year Fixed-eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat p-value 0.670 0.515 0.013 0.125 0.105 0.760
Observations 6799 6551 6532 5996 5877 5859
R2 0.052 0.057 0.552 0.054 0.086 0.415
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LC‐to‐Cash  =  0.42    ‐   0.09*Beta KMV 
                        (12.3)      (‐2.8) 
 